



Charles E. Clark *
W HEN I came to the Court of Appeals in 1939 the two
Judges Hand were already of massive and imposing repu-
tation. I had had very little direct contact with either of them
except as I had assisted in the separate awards of honorary degrees
to them at the hands of my university. I approached my first
sittings with not a little fear and trembling because of the sup-
posedly dread character of these famed judges and the profound
traditions of our court. But I need have had no worry, for I dis-
covered both of them to be the most human of persons, to whom
the adjective "stuffy" was the least correct description conceiv-
able. Some one has said that "one need not be pompous to be a
good judge, but it does help." No such prescription can be found
at all useful for the Hand make-up. Both of them abhorred pre-
tentiousness and were quick to appreciate and to pounce joyously
on any tendencies toward it.
In fact, my deepest recollection of my years of service with
these two distinguished men is of the pure fun involved. Each
had a marvelous sense of humor, and to each the foibles and in-
consistencies of mankind always made a deep appeal. To say that
it was - stimulus to work with them is a vast understatement. It
was a tally as near sheer delight as one could expect anywhere in
the rt -es of our somewhat dusty profession. True, we had our
intelleL I differences; a part of the joy was their tolerance of
other ex ssions of view, combined with their delight in the en-
suing int Jectual joust. I have been amazed at times to see how
* Chief judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. B.A., Yale, 191X,
LL.B., 1913.
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outsiders have thought to discover possible sears from these
affrays; of course there were none.
It is rather difficult to separate the two cousins, for they were
such perfect foils to each other. This has been often pointed out,
never better than by the Nestor of our bar, Charles C. Burling-
ham. Of them he wrote with apt characterization: "They are a
remarkable pair, both open-minded and fearless- Learned bril-
liant and speculative - Augustus wise and unwavering." 1 I
understand it has been the saying among lawyers about our court
that one Hand does not know what the other Hand is doing.
Whatever modicum of truth this may suggest, it does remain a
fact that often one Hand would decidedly not wish to go along
with the other. I have observed many battles of this kind, both
legal and personal. Among fond recollections are those of re-
curring bouts in the midst of Foley Square over the issue where
we should have lunch, ending at best in an uneasy truce, with
one Hand setting off for a restaurant on lower Broadway, while
the other departed for Chambers Street. Willy-nilly the rest of
the court had to divide and follow as best it could. But whenever
a third person intervened he was likely to find that he had taken
on both together, as one rushed to the other's support. Needless
to say, this was an opposition hardly to be overborne, as I can
testify from many a legal case. Indeed, their reactions to all sorts
of happenings, legal, personal, or otherwise, perfectly comple-
mented one another. I can remember one evening of eulogy where
Learned responded in somewhat tearful, but highly eloquent,
kind, while Gus preserved his accustomed poise and balance. His
comment to me the next day was, "Don't you think Learned is
too emotional?" Their diversities, as well as the general respect
and affection for both, are well illustrated by Justice Jackson's
classic barb uttered in an evening of general acclaim: "In short,
just a word of advice to you district judges here present: Always
quote Learned and follow Gus."
There is no doubt that Learned Hand's brilliant and volatile
nature, coupled with his unusual stylistic gifts, has served to
render him better known to the general public than his cousin.
Nor, I take it, would Augustus have wished otherwise; certainly
he did little to draw the crowd and contented himself in perform-
ing his judicial task with a competence that was the envy and the
delight of the profession. But that he could have gone far as a
1 Burlingham, Judge Learned Hand, 6o HARv. L. REv. 330, 331 (1947).
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judicial stylist I have no doubt. He had a dry wit and a gift of
characterization which was deep and sure. And though one
would not appreciate it from casual acquaintance - so carefully
did he eschew any affectation of learning -he had an excellent
classical background upon which he could call if he chose. One is
apt to get but fleeting traces of this in his writings, as in his
affectionate introduction of a favorite law clerk, Judge Wyzanski,
on the occasion of the latter's Cardozo lecture,2 or in a speech in
1946 before the Pennsylvania Bar Association in a characteristi-
cally happy, though nevertheless warmly philosophical, strain.'
But my own favorite is from a case which became the touchstone
for testing in World War II conscientious objection to war serv-
ice based on religious belief- "a belief finding expression in a
conscience which categorically requires the believer to disregard
elementary self-interest and to accept martyrdom in preference
to transgressing its tenets." I He continued:
A religious obligation forbade Socrates, even in order to escape con-
demnation, to entreat his judges to acquit him, because he believed that
it was their sworn duty to decide questions without favor to anyone and
only according to law. Such an obligation impelled Martin Luther to
nail his theses on the door of the church at Wittenberg and, when he
was summoned before Emperor Charles and the Diet at Worms, stead-
fastly to hold his ground and to utter the often quoted words: "I neither
can nor will recant anything, since it is neither right nor safe to act
against conscience. Here I stand. I cannot do other. God help me.
Amen." Recognition of this obligation moved the Greek poet Menander
to write almost twenty-four hundred years ago: "Conscience is a God
to all mortals"; impelled Socrates to obey the voice of his "Daimon"
and led Wordsworth to characterize "Duty" as the "Stern Daughter of
the Voice of God." 5
As I look back upon it, I wish that he might have let himself
soar more often to the end that others beyond his professional
intimates might have known the glories of expression of which he
was capable. So, too, I wish it were possible to bring back his
2 A. N. Hand, Introduction, in WyzANsxi, A TR=A JUDGE'S FREEDOM AN RE-
sPONSIBnIrY 3-5 (1952). See also, for example, his opinion cited note 9 infra.3 A. N. Hand, Lawyers in a Revolutionary Age, x8 PA. BAu ASS'N Q. 46 (x946);
see also A. N. Hand, Practice of the Law- Then and Now, 34 PROCEM3NGS VT.
BARAS'N 6 (1940).
United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 7o3, 7o8 (2d Cir. 1943).
5 Ibid. See also quotation by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 3i9 U.S. 624, 658-59 (3g43).
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salty comments on things and persons: on law professors who"pant for a new chose in action [or new legal remedy] 'As the
hart panteth after the water brooks"'; I on "the children of the
dawn" who continually favor change; I on a "strong court" whose
judgments he selectively chose and respected; on a youthful dis-
regard of disliked decisions, even if representing settled law, "as
the mutterings of Balaam's ass, perfectly valid but having no con-
scious intelligence in the sources from which they proceeded." 8
But these are for the most part lost, since the dignity and restraint
of his opinions did not permit of the levity to which his gay and
humorous outlook on life continually brought himY Perhaps some
touches contained in the memoranda interchanged among his
brethren on cases awaiting decision may be rescued in time if these
intimate documents may be revealed.
This is not the place to attempt an estimate of his judicial work;
that, indeed, covers a wide sweep, touching now a truly liberal
charge to the jury in a World War I sedition case,10 down through
his epoch-making decision in the "movie case," I" and his notable
recognition of property in "Seventeen," the teen-age designation
adopted by a magazine for itself and certain selected products. 2
But I would, if I could, recapture the warm human friendship, the
steady evenness of temper, the intimate concern for all one was
doing and all one's family affairs. Never have I seen him upset
or despondent, notwithstanding severe blows of fate; and, while
he was capable of righteous indignation, there was not an element
in him which was mean or petty. It is not without significance that
the most recurring references to him are in such terms as "un-
wavering" or "steadfast" or -to use Judge Wyzanski's fitting




o Thus his powerful and persuasive opinion in United States v. One Book Entitled
Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d 7o5 (2d Cir. 1934), has not achieved the fame
(except among lawyers) of the quotable lilt of a part of the opinion below, 5
F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
'o Charge to the jury in the prosecution of Max Eastman, as quoted in
CHAEE, FREE SPEECH 3N THE UNITED STATEs 78-79 (1941).
"United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 323, 70 F. Supp. 53
(S-D.N.Y. 1946), aff'd in part, 334 U.S. 131 (1948), on remand, 85 F. Supp. 881
(S.D.N.Y. x949).
12 Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. x948).
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summary -" "his steadiness of purpose." 11 The touchstone of his
life seems, indeed, to be that passage from Thomas Carlyle's Past
and Present which he was fond of quoting I and which concludes:
Here is all fulness
Ye brave, to reward you;
Work, and despair not.15
l&Wyzanski, Augustus Noble Hand, 6i HARv. L. REv. 573, 591 (1948).
"1 As in A. N. Hand, Lawyers in a Revolutionary Age, 18 PA. BAR Ass'N Q. 46,
58 (1946), and A. N. Hand, Practice of the Law - Then and Now, 34 PROCEEDINGS
VT. BAR Ass'x 61, 79-o (1940).
15 P. 13o (Everyman's ed. 1912).
